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 The recognized and prospective unions of workers at Yale University have for 
many years been joined in an alliance that presents a fairly typical example of cross-unit 
solidarity.1  This alliance, now known as the Federation of Hospital and University 
Employees, is comprised of Local 35, representing Yale’s service and maintenance 
workers; Local 34, representing Yale’s clerical and technical workers;2 the Graduate 
Employees and Students Organization (GESO), which seeks recognition as the 
bargaining unit for Yale’s graduate student teachers;3 and a group of workers at Yale 
New-Haven Hospital who seek union recognition.4 
The reasons for this solidarity are straightforward.  The prospective unions feel 
that their chances of receiving voluntary recognition are greater with the support of 
Yale’s established unions, who might raise the issue of recognition of the prospective 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the history of unions at Yale (with special attention to the prospective union of 
graduate student teachers), see WILL TEACH FOR FOOD: ACADEMIC LABOR IN CRISIS (Cary Nelson ed., 
1997). 
 
2 Locals 34 and 35 are affiliates of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union. 
 
3 Until 2000, the status of graduate student teachers at private universities as “employees” within the 
meaning of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was uncertain.  During a brief golden age 
from 2000 to 2004, they were employees; now it seems they are not.  See New York University, 332 
N.L.R.B. 111 (2000); Brown University, 1-RC-21386 (N.L.R.B. July 13, 2004).  For discussion of the 
issues involved in graduate student unionization, see Neal H. Hutchens & Melissa B. Hutchens, Catching 
the Union Bug: Graduate Student Employees and Unionization, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 105 (2003); Joshua 
Rowland, “Forecasts of Doom”: The Dubious Threat of Graduate Teaching Assistant Collective 
Bargaining to Academic Freedom, 42 B.C. L. REV. 941 (2001); Grant M. Hayden, “The University Works 
Because We Do”: Collective Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 
(2001). 
 
4 District 1199 of the Service Employees International Union currently represents about 150 dietary 
workers at the hospital, and is seeking to become the representative of approximately 1,800 other hospital 
employees.  Although Yale New-Haven Hospital and Yale University are independent entities, the hospital 
has an operating agreement with the university, and several Yale administrators, including its president, 
serve on the hospital’s board of trustees.  Employees at both institutions tend to see themselves as part of a 




unions in the course of their own contract negotiations with the university.  The members 
of Locals 34 and 35, in turn, believe that an increase in the number of unionized 
employees at Yale would increase the bargaining strength of all of the unions. 
 Are such beliefs well founded?  To what extent are Locals 34 and 35 really able to 
assist the prospective unions in their attempt to achieve recognition?  And how would the 
unionization of these additional groups actually benefit the existing unions?  Both of 
these questions involve the issue of cross-unit solidarity – separate unions attempting to 
stand together in mutual support.  How much can be achieved, as a practical matter, from 
such solidarity?  Moral support and encouragement, and perhaps an influence on public 
opinion, are surely important benefits, and not to be ignored; but can unions actually gain 
any legal advantage by their solidarity?  The answer depends on the extent to which the 
unions are able to make effective bargaining demands in support of one another without 
being found to have committed an unfair labor practice for insisting on bargaining 
beyond the established units. 
 This essay has five parts.  Part I reviews the two categories into which cross-unit 
bargaining demands are conventionally divided, based on whether a union may or may 
not legally persist in making the demand to the point of bargaining impasse.  Part II 
proposes an alternative analytical framework that classifies cross-unit bargaining 
demands into four categories, based on two variables:  whether the demand is primarily 
for the benefit of the union making it or for others; and whether the demand is primarily 
substantive or procedural (whether it relates to substantive issues of employment or to the 
bargaining process itself).  Part III explores an area of cross-unit bargaining, brought to 
light by the foregoing analysis, that has been overlooked – procedural cross-unit 
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bargaining demands, made by one union on behalf of another and relating to procedural 
issues of bargaining.  Such demands have been largely neglected by unions, and have 
seen little review by courts.  Part IV argues for the legality of procedural cross-unit 
demands, noting that they are able to avoid a legal hurdle that the National Labor 
Relations Act presents to other cross-unit demands.  Part V makes a case for the potential 
substantive benefits that unions may obtain through the use of procedural cross-unit 
demands, and examines the possibility that a union might persist in such a demand to the 
point of impasse without committing an unfair labor practice. 
 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL CATEGORIES:  MULTI-UNIT BARGAINING 
AND COORDINATED BARGAINING 
 
 Bargaining demands made by separate unions in support of one another, when 
insisted upon and pursued to the point of impasse, are sometimes acceptable and 
sometimes an unfair labor practice (as a violation of the union’s duty under § 8(b)(3) of 
the NLRA to bargain in good faith).  The labels “multi-unit bargaining” and “coordinated 
bargaining” have been used by some courts and commentators to distinguish, 
respectively, illegal and legal cross-unit bargaining demands.5  Multi-unit bargaining 
involves attempts by unions to insist on bargaining over issues relating to employees 
outside the unit or to insist that the employer bargain with several units together.  Multi-
unit bargaining is an unfair labor practice because courts consider it to be an attempt to 
alter unilaterally the scope of the bargaining unit, which is a violation of the duty to 
                                                 
5 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Multi-Unit Collective Bargaining: Autonomy and Dependence in Liberal 
Thought, 72 GEO. L.J. 1369, 1370-71 (1984). 
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bargain in good faith.6  In coordinated bargaining, on the other hand, unions do not 
attempt to merge bargaining units.  Each unit bargains separately on its own behalf, but 
some attempt is made to coordinate the outcomes, through such strategies as including 
members of one union on another union’s bargaining committee, or having all the unions 
bargain separately for the same contract expiration date so as to create the possibility of 
simultaneous strikes.7 
 The distinction between legal coordinated bargaining and illegal multi-unit 
bargaining is connected with the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects 
of bargaining (those subjects over which the parties must bargain, and those over which 
they may bargain but are not required to).  During bargaining, a union or an employer 
may assume a firm position on a mandatory subject of bargaining and persist in its 
demand to the point of impasse without committing an unfair labor practice; but an 
unyielding position on a permissive subject, carried to impasse, constitutes a failure to 
bargain in good faith, since the other party is not obligated to bargain on that subject.  
The Supreme Court first established the distinction between mandatory and permissive 
bargaining subjects in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner,8 and in Allied 
Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass9 the Court articulated a test for 
determining when a union’s bargaining demand concerning workers outside the unit 
relates to a mandatory subject:  the union’s demand must represent a direct frontal attack 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Douds v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 
7 For examples of coordinated bargaining strategies in the automobile industry, see HARRY C. KATZ, 
SHIFTING GEARS: CHANGING LABOR RELATIONS IN THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 174-180 (1985). 
 
8 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
 
9 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
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on a matter that vitally affects its members’ job security or the terms and conditions of 
their employment.10  Unions engaged in a coordinated bargaining campaign may persist 
in their demands to the point of impasse without committing an unfair labor practice, 
provided that each union’s demands are limited to subjects that vitally affect that union’s 
employment and are therefore mandatory.  But when a union makes a demand that 
concerns the terms of employment of workers outside its bargaining unit with little effect 
on those within it, the National Labor Relations Board and the courts are likely to 
consider that the demand does not relate to a mandatory subject of bargaining for the 
union that makes it, because it does not vitally affect that union’s employment.  Such a 
union has engaged in multi-unit bargaining, by attempting to bargain beyond the scope of 
the established bargaining unit.  Because multi-unit bargaining demands are held to be 
merely permissive subjects of bargaining, if the employer does not consent to bargain 
over issues reaching beyond the scope of the unit, the union commits an unfair labor 
practice by persisting in its demand. 
 Milton Regan has argued that multi-unit bargaining demands should be 
considered mandatory subjects, and that unions should therefore be permitted to insist on 
bargaining beyond their units.11  He asserts that the Board’s determination of the 
appropriate unit under § 9(b) of the NLRA is made for the purpose of a representation 
election, and should therefore not be seen as limiting the appropriate scope of the 
bargaining unit.12  He further observes that one of the stated purposes of the NLRA is to 
                                                 
10 Id. at 178-79. 
 
11 Regan, supra note 5. 
 
12 Id. at 1401.  For discussion and analysis of the bargaining unit’s separate roles in the representation 
election and in the bargaining process, see Alexander Colvin, Rethinking Bargaining Unit Determination: 
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redress the inequality of bargaining power between employees and their employer, and 
argues that this requires that multiple unions be permitted to join together in bargaining 
with their employer, who might otherwise be able to pursue a divide-and-conquer 
strategy.13  Another aim of the NLRA, the maintenance of industrial stability, is similarly 
thwarted by permanently fixing bargaining arrangements that may not remain suitable 
with the passage of time, rather than allowing units to combine as circumstances 
suggest.14  Regan also argues that employees’ freedom of choice in selecting bargaining 
representatives is compatible with treating multi-unit bargaining demands as mandatory 
subjects.15  Finally, he notes that under the test established in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 
multi-unit bargaining demands should ostensibly be considered mandatory subjects when 
they vitally affect the employment or job security of the members of the union that makes 
them, and yet courts regularly seem to hold multi-union bargaining to be an unfair labor 
practice per se, without even reaching the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test; they apparently 
assume that multi-unit bargaining can never satisfy that test.16  Regan concludes that the 
legal distinction between multi-unit bargaining and coordinated bargaining continues to 
be made because of the tension that we feel in a liberal state between the desire for 
individual autonomy and the practical need for human interdependence.17  Disallowing 
multi-unit bargaining permits the law to proclaim its support for bargaining autonomy, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Labor Law and the Structure of Collective Representation in a Changing Workplace, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 419 (1998). 
 




15 Id. at 1403-07. 
 
16 Id. at 1409-11. 
 
17 Id. at 1412-22. 
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and allowing coordinated bargaining permits it to accept the reality of unit 
interdependence.  Regan suggests that the supposed categorical differentiation between 
multi-unit bargaining and coordinated bargaining is little more than an artificial 
distinction that allows the continued simultaneous support of these opposing notions of 
autonomy and dependence.18 
Most of Regan’s arguments in favor of multi-unit bargaining are concerned with 
what he believes the law ought to be, not what it is.  Only one of his arguments – that it is 
curious and inconsistent that courts often do not apply the Pittsburgh Plate Glass “vitally 
affects” test to such demands – attempts to support the legality of multi-unit bargaining 
under the current case law, and even there he suggests that courts should do other than 
they do.  Unlike Regan, I will not attempt in this essay to argue that multi-unit bargaining 
should be wholly legal, and I will resist making assertions about what courts ought to 
hold, when they have clearly followed another path. 
 
II. TOWARD A NEW TAXONOMY OF CROSS-UNIT BARGAINING DEMANDS 
 
In the following pages I will review several cases involving either coordinated 
bargaining or multi-unit bargaining (depending on whether the Board or court has ruled 
for the union or against it, respectively).  For the sake of this analysis I will momentarily 
set aside the established labels and categories – mandatory and permissive, coordinated 
and multi-unit – and will instead ask two basic questions in each case.  First, is the 
union’s demand made primarily and directly for the benefit of the members of the union 
                                                 
18 Id. at 1422. 
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making the demand, or for someone else?  Second, does the union’s demand relate to a 
substantive contract matter (wages, hours, etc.), or does it instead relate primarily to the 
bargaining process itself?  These two basic questions, each with two possible answers, 























In each case involving cross-unit bargaining, we may note how the Board or court 
characterizes the union demand at issue – as a demand for itself or for another, and as 
relating primarily to a substantive or to a procedural matter – and then we may assign the 
case to one of the four quadrants.  These simple questions are intended to maintain focus 
on some basic distinctions that can sometimes be obscured by the conventional labels, 
and to bring attention to an area of cross-unit bargaining demands that unions have 
largely neglected:  those belonging to the fourth quadrant of the grid set forth above, 
procedural cross-unit bargaining demands. 
With regard to the first question, I assume that all union demands are ultimately 
intended to benefit the union that makes them.  It is of course possible that a union might 
act with purely selfless and altruistic intent, but usually we can see that any demand on 
behalf of some other group is expected ultimately and indirectly to benefit the union 
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itself.  So the first question, “Is the union’s demand for the union itself, or for another?”, 
might be rephrased as, “Is the union’s demand intended to benefit the union directly, or 
indirectly?”  I will generally use the “self vs. other” language, with the understanding that 
some indirect or long-term benefit to the union is typically expected in the “other” cases. 
The second question concerns whether a union’s demand relates to the 
employment relationship or to the bargaining relationship; the former I will call 
“substantive,” and the latter “procedural.”  Any demand may of course have some impact 
on the bargaining process, and some demands may be made more for their value as chips 
in the bargaining game than for their content; but only demands that directly concern the 
bargaining process will receive in this essay the label “procedural.”  An example of a 
procedural demand is a union’s insistence that its bargaining committee include members 
of other unions.  Such a demand does not relate to the substantive matters of the 
employment relationship that are being bargained over; it relates only to the details of the 
bargaining process itself. 
The application of these two questions to various union demands will often reveal 
a characterization problem:  the questions could be answered either way, depending upon 
how one looks at the demand.  For instance, as noted above, almost any union demand on 
behalf of some other party is ultimately expected to benefit the union itself; sometimes 
this is so transparent, and the expected benefit so immediate, that it seems appropriate to 
characterize the demand as being for the union itself, even if it is nominally for someone 
else.  Similarly, unions make procedural demands because they expect them to result 
ultimately in better substantive employment terms, and when this connection is especially 
clear and direct, it may seem better to characterize the demand as substantive rather than 
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procedural.  Reading the cases, it is often apparent that different reviewers (the Board and 
a reviewing court, or a court’s majority and the dissent) would not answer these questions 
in the same way, and that their different answers to these questions are closely connected 
to their different resolutions of the case. 
To start with an easy case, in Atlas Transit Mix Corp.19 the Board held to be a 
mandatory subject of bargaining a union’s demand relating to a “most-favored-nations” 
clause in its contract.  Clauses of this sort provide that if one of the two parties to the 
contract negotiates with any third party an agreement containing more favorable terms, 
those terms will be incorporated into the contract.  For instance, a most-favored-nations 
clause in Union A’s contract might provide that if the employer settles a contract with 
Union B or Union C granting more generous wages and benefits, those terms are to be 
applied in Union A’s contract as well.  In Atlas Transit, the employer had argued that the 
union’s unyielding demand concerning a most-favored-nations clause amounted to an 
unfair labor practice.  The Board did not agree.  “Regarding the assertion that the Union 
insisted on bargaining to impasse on a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, a most-
favored-nations clause, this contention is equally without merit….  a most-favored-
nations clause, contrary to Respondent’s contention, is a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
and can be insisted on to impasse.”20 
To take up our first question, was the union’s demand intended primarily for the 
benefit of the union itself, or for another?  Clearly the former; the union was motivated 
by the effect that such a clause might have on the terms of its own contract, and the 
                                                 
19 323 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1997). 
 
20 Id. at 1149. 
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clause could have no direct effect on anyone else’s contract.  Most-favored-nations 
clauses, by their very nature, always make reference to other contracts and other parties, 
but they do not attempt to change the terms of those other contracts or directly affect 
those other parties.  The point of such a clause is of course to alter the terms of the 
contract in which it appears, and a party making a demand relating to such a clause is 
concerned with its own contract.  The union’s demand should therefore be characterized 
as being on behalf of the union itself.  Next, did the demand relate primarily to a 
substantive matter, or to a procedural one?  This second question, again, turns on whether 
the demand concerns the employment relationship, or the bargaining process.  The 
demand in Atlas Transit was plainly substantive; the union’s interest in the most-favored-
nations clause was due to the effects that it might have on the substantive terms and 
conditions of the union’s employment.  Under the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test, such a 
demand would be considered to relate to a mandatory subject of bargaining:  it directly 
affects the employment of the members of the bargaining unit. 
The preceding case thus belongs to the first quadrant (“self” and “substantive”) of 
our grid.  Such first-quadrant scenarios, in which a union’s bargaining demand relates 
primarily to its own substantive employment issues, are relatively uncontroversial and are 
not often litigated as cases of cross-unit solidarity.  When they do arise, they are typically 
considered cases of legal coordinated bargaining as opposed to illegal multi-unit 
bargaining, and the judgment is therefore for the union; demands that relate to a union’s 
own substantive issues are easily seen as involving mandatory subjects of bargaining, and 
the union may therefore insist on them to impasse without committing an unfair labor 
practice.  In Pittsburgh Plate Glass itself, the Board’s decision below had held that the 
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union’s demands were of this nature.  The Board supported the union’s demands on 
behalf of retirees, on the grounds that the retirees were part of the bargaining unit; but it 
also argued in the alternative that even if the retirees were not part of the unit, the union 
in making its demand was essentially trying to protect its own retirement benefits.21  The 
Board would thus have described the demand as relating to the union’s own substantive 
employment issues.  But the Court disagreed, holding that the union’s demand was on 
behalf of others beyond those in the bargaining unit.22  Because the Court was not 
persuaded that the demand directly affected the terms of employment of those in the 
bargaining unit, it refused to characterize it as relating to a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.23  This illustrates the characterization problem mentioned above; the Board 
and the Court gave different answers to the question “On whose behalf was this demand 
made?”  In terms of our grid, the Board saw this as a first-quadrant demand, but the Court 
held instead that it belonged to the third-quadrant. 
General Electric Co. v. NLRB,24 a landmark coordinated bargaining case, presents 
an example of a procedural as opposed to a substantive demand.  The employer, G.E., 
objected to the presence on the union’s bargaining committee of representatives from 
G.E.’s other unions.  The union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE), continued to insist that its bargaining committee include 
members of the other unions, and would not yield in this demand.  G.E. contended that 
this was an illegal attempt to force bargaining beyond the scope of the established 
                                                 
21 404 U.S. at 162. 
 
22 Id. at 172-73. 
 
23 Id. at 182. 
 
24 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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bargaining unit; in other words, it was illegal multi-unit bargaining.  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the union’s right to make such a demand.  Was 
this demand for the union itself, or for another party?  And was it substantive, or 
procedural?  The court answers: “[T]he plain facts are that the IUE proposed negotiating 
technique… is designed to strengthen IUE’s bargaining position.…  it would be nonsense 
to pretend that IUE’s purpose was not to increase its bargaining strength.…”25  The 
demand, the court asserts, is on behalf of the union itself (it is its own bargaining strength 
which the union hopes to increase), and is procedural – that is, it relates not to substantive 
terms of employment, but to the details of the bargaining process itself.  The union aims 
to achieve a stronger position in the bargaining process, from which it may then bargain 
over substantive issues.  The immediate goal is clearly procedural.  This case, then, 
presents an example of a second-quadrant demand. 
It should be noted that General Electric does not involve anything like the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass test for determining when a union’s demand relates to a 
mandatory subject; indeed, it does not at all discuss the mandatory/permissive question.  
Rather, the court simply observes that employees have a right under § 7 to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and that an employer has a 
duty under § 8(a)(5) to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.26  
If the committee had attempted to make substantive demands relating to employees other 
than those represented by IUE, the analysis would have become more complicated.27  But 
                                                 
25 Id. at 519. 
 
26 Id. at 516, 520, 523. 
 
27 Id. at 520. 
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in fact the committee in this case never tried to bargain for any employees other than 
those represented by IUE.28 
 In United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB,29 three unions of the same 
employer insisted that all of their contracts have the same expiration date.  Each union 
negotiated with the employer separately, and each bargained only over the expiration date 
of its own contract, but all demanded the same date.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board 
in upholding the unions’ right to make such a demand.  This case may also be assigned to 
our second quadrant:  the court notes that each union’s demand relates only to itself and 
its own contract, not to the other unions; and it characterizes the demand as being 
fundamentally procedural, as relating not to substantive terms of employment but rather 
to the dynamics of the bargaining process.30  This case was decided nine years before 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass but the court nonetheless precociously applies a very similar test 
in determining that the unions’ demand involves a mandatory subject: 
Under the facts of this case viewed realistically, a common 
expiration date of all three contracts had a vitally important 
connection with the “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment” of the employees at each plant….  With a 
common expiration date, it is obvious that each union might be 
able to negotiate a more advantageous new contract for the 
employees represented by that union.31 
 
                                                 
28 Id. at 522. 
 
29 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 
30 Id. at 878 (“[A] common expiration date for all three contracts vitally affects the ability of each union 
separately to bargain.”). 
 
31 Id. at 877. 
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(Note the similarity of “vitally important connection” to “vitally affects.”) 
 In Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,32 several unions demanded that 
their common employer make identical contract offers for all of the units, and withheld 
final settlement until their demand was met.  The Board held that the unions were 
effectively trying “to force the contract terms negotiated for one unit upon the other 
units” and had therefore committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining outside of the 
established units.33  The Board’s decision suggests that each union’s demand relates 
primarily not to itself but to other units:  a union’s demand that, before it will accept and 
ratify an offer made to it, identical and concurrent offers must be made to other units, 
does not primarily affect the terms of its own offer but rather the terms of the other units’ 
offers.  And the Board clearly considers the demand to be substantive in nature, meant to 
force particular substantive contract terms.  Third-quadrant demands of this sort, relating 
primarily to the substantive terms of another union’s employment, are classic examples 
of multi-unit bargaining.  As Regan warns us to expect, the Board never mentions the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass test – never considers whether or not each union’s demand might 
in some way “vitally affect” the terms of its own employment.34  The determination that 




                                                 
32 203 N.L.R.B. 230 (1973). 
 
33 Id. at 239. 
 
34 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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III. PROCEDURAL CROSS-UNIT BARGAINING:  UNEXPLORED TERRITORY 
 
 The cases reviewed above involving cross-unit solidarity have illustrated several 
combinations of answers to our two basic questions (for self or other?  substantive or 
procedural?).  We have seen first-quadrant demands on the union’s own behalf that relate 
to terms of employment (“self” and “substantive”); second-quadrant demands on the 
union’s own behalf that relate to the bargaining process (“self” and “procedural”); and 
third-quadrant demands on behalf of other employees that relate to terms of employment 
(“other” and “substantive”).  Logically, the fourth quadrant ought to produce a demand as 
well (“other” and “procedural”):  a demand made by the union on behalf of other 
employees that relates to their bargaining process.  A basic fourth-quadrant demand 
might require that the employer negotiate with another group of employees; a union 
insisting on such a demand to the point of impasse would refuse to settle its own 
collective bargaining agreement until the employer had also settled one with the other 
group of employees.  There are very few instances of this type of procedural cross-unit 
demand in the case law, and the legal issue they present appears never to have been 
properly settled. 
 Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB35 presents an example of such a fourth-quadrant 
demand.  After a union had reached agreement with the employer on the terms of its own 
contract, it refused to execute the written contract until another union also reached a 
contract.  This is clearly a fourth-quadrant scenario:  the first union’s demand was for the 
benefit of the second union, not for itself; and the demand was not concerned with the 
                                                 
35 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963). 
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substantive terms of the agreement, but merely with its process.  The first union did not 
demand that the second union receive a wage increase, or an improved pension plan; it 
did not demand that their hours of employment be reduced.  All of these matters – wages, 
hours, etc. – were of course to be governed by the contract which the first union 
demanded that the employer negotiate with the second union, but the first union’s 
demand did not relate to any of them and was therefore, by the definition we have been 
using, not a substantive demand.  The demand put pressure on the employer to reach an 
agreement with the second union, and thus increased the second union’s power in the 
bargaining process.  Demands pertaining to the bargaining process are procedural 
demands.  Even if the second union had not yet been recognized by the employer, so that 
the first union’s demand that the employer bargain with the second union essentially 
included a demand that the employer recognize the second union as the bargaining 
representative for those employees, such a demand should still be considered procedural, 
because, again, it still relates to aspects (fundamental ones, to be sure) of the bargaining 
process.  A recognition demand is perhaps of a different order than other procedural 
demands; but nonetheless, it is not a demand about wages, hours, or other substantive 
issues of employment.  It relates only to the process through which those substantive 
matters will be bargained over. 
In Standard Oil, the Sixth Circuit held the union’s demand to be an unfair labor 
practice, agreeing with and enforcing the Board’s decision below.  It is important to note, 
however, that the court explicitly bases its decision on the union’s violation of the duty to 
execute a written contract after reaching agreement.36  In other words, after agreement 
                                                 
36 Id. at 45. 
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had been reached, any sort of demand from any quadrant, whether substantive or 
procedural, for self or for other, would have similarly violated the duty to execute a 
written contract.  The decision thus offers little analysis of this particular type of demand, 
and demonstrates that even where the case law does present a rare example of a fourth-
quadrant demand, it provides little insight into how labor law should consider such 
demands.  The Standard Oil court distinguishes its case from United States Pipe & 
Foundry,37 where a coordinated bargaining arrangement had been allowed, by pointing 
out that the union in Standard Oil had failed to bring up its demand at the bargaining 
table.38  We cannot infer that the court would have approved of the union’s demand that 
the employer also settle its contract with the other union, if that demand had been made 
in a timely manner; but at least we can note that the court does not dismiss it merely 
because it is a demand that relates to another union’s bargaining process. 
 Similarly, in AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Committee for Phelps Dodge v. NLRB,39 
several unions that were engaged in separate simultaneous contract negotiations with 
their employer demanded simultaneous settlement of all of their contracts.  The Board’s 
decision below, against the unions, was based on its belief that what the unions were 
really trying to do was to merge all the bargaining units and establish a company-wide 
contract with identical terms for all the unions.40  Thus the Board did not consider the 
union’s demand specifically as a fourth-quadrant demand, but simply decided that the 
whole situation smelled of multi-unit bargaining.  It held that even if the unions’ 
                                                 
37 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 
38 322 F.2d at 45. 
 
39 459 F.2d 374 (1972). 
 
40 Id. at 375. 
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particular demands were all mandatory subjects of bargaining, the overall plan was 
nonetheless aimed at enlarging the bargaining unit and was therefore illegal.41  The Third 
Circuit overturned the Board and held for the unions.  However, the court took care to 
emphasize, more than once, that the posture of the case was such that the scope of its 
review was limited “to the determination of whether or not the Board’s findings are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record and have a basis in law.”42  The court 
held that the Board’s findings were without such support, because the record indicated 
that each of the separate bargaining units had conducted separate negotiations with the 
employer, and that they had not insisted on company-wide terms and conditions of 
employment.43  The unions had therefore not committed an unfair labor practice.  The 
posture of the case and the limited scope of review prevented the court from actually 
considering the legality of the unions’ fourth-quadrant demand.  “Assuming without 
deciding, as the Board did, that those demands were all mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, as such the unions may bargain to impasse on each or all of them.”44  Neither 
the Board nor the court in this case actually decided that such demands are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.  Both were, for different reasons, merely “assuming without 
deciding” that the demands were mandatory – the Board because it thought it could 
dispose of the case on more general grounds, and the court because the scope of its 
review was limited.  We are thus again frustrated in our attempt to find real evaluation of 
fourth-quadrant demands in the case law.  As in Standard Oil, the court here decided the 
                                                 
41 Id. at 378 (describing the court’s understanding of the Board’s opinion). 
 
42 Id. at 376, 377. 
 
43 Id. at 378. 
 
44 Id. (emphasis added). 
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case on other grounds, and we have no indication of the degree of favor, or disfavor, that 
such demands might receive under labor law. 
 
IV. THE LEGALITY OF PROCEDURAL CROSS-UNIT BARGAINING 
 
 What would a court say if it were to consider the merits of a fourth-quadrant 
demand maintained by a union to the point of bargaining impasse?  Would the union be 
participating in legal coordinated bargaining, or would it be guilty of illegal multi-unit 
bargaining?  As with other demands, this question would come down to whether the 
demand relates to a mandatory subject of bargaining or not; and this should be 
determined by the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test:  does the union’s demand directly address 
a matter that vitally affects its job security or the terms and conditions of its employment? 
 We noted above that Milton Regan has observed that when courts conclude that a 
union’s demand amounts to an attempt to expand the bargaining unit by bargaining over 
matters relating to employees outside the established unit, they often do not reach the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass test; instead they simply declare the demand to be multi-unit 
bargaining and an unfair labor practice.45  I believe that some insight into the potential 
legality of fourth-quadrant demands may be gained from a close look at the cases Regan 
cites, though they are not themselves fourth-quadrant cases.  Regan takes issue with the 
way the cases have been decided, and thinks that courts ought still to apply the “vitally 
affects” test to demands for multi-union bargaining, arguing that there are clearly 
situations in which such demands would vitally affect the employment of the union 
                                                 
45 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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making them.  Even if it is not possible to defend the legality of all multi-unit bargaining 
generally under the current practices of courts (as Regan laments), it may be nonetheless 
possible to support the narrow legality of fourth-quadrant demands specifically, under the 
current state of the law.  Regan, by failing to consider the distinction between substantive 
and procedural demands, has perhaps painted too bleak a picture of the legality of unions’ 
extra-unit bargaining demands. 
 Regan cites a number of cases to illustrate that courts rarely apply the Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass test once they have decided that a union is bargaining beyond the scope of its 
established unit, and if they do apply it, they seem to conclude that multi-unit bargaining 
can never satisfy it.46  In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB,47 the 
union had insisted on bargaining over benefit plans on a company-wide basis, demanding 
that the employer negotiate terms for several bargaining units at once.  The D.C. Circuit 
observed that OCAW’s demand called for multi-unit bargaining, and that this was merely 
a voluntary subject over which the union could not insist that the employer bargain.48  
Similarly, in Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB,49 a mine workers’ union had bargained to impasse 
on its demand for a contract clause that would require the employer coal company to 
apply the terms of the existing union contract to employees at other mines.  The Third 
Circuit stated that the scope of the bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject, that the 
clause would require the company to bargain with the union about wages and other 
conditions of employment of employees in other units, and that the union had therefore 
                                                 
46 Regan, supra note 5, at 1409-10 and footnotes thereto. 
 
47 486 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 
48 Id. at 1268. 
 
49 614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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committed an unfair labor practice.50  Neither the OCAW court nor the Amax court 
considered Pittsburgh Plate Glass.  In Sperry Systems Mgmt. Div., Sperry Rand Corp. v. 
NLRB,51 the Second Circuit found that a union’s demand that its contract be extended to 
cover employees at a new facility amounted to an attempt to bargain over the terms of 
employment of workers outside the unit.52  The court did invoke the Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass test, but held that the terms of employment at the new facility did not vitally affect 
the workers represented by the union.53 
In all of Regan’s examples, the guilty unions have attempted to bargain over the 
substantive terms of employment of employees outside the bargaining unit; there are no 
examples of demands relating to other employees’ bargaining process (i.e., fourth-
quadrant demands).  We may be tempted to believe that this is due merely to the near 
total absence of fourth-quadrant cases, and to assume that if there were cases with 
demands relating to other employees’ bargaining process, they would most likely also be 
condemned by these courts as multi-unit bargaining.  This, however, is not certain.  The 
language in which these cases condemn multi-unit bargaining embraces only substantive 
demands, not procedural ones, and even emphasizes the substantive nature of these extra-
unit demands as specific reason to condemn them. 
In OCAW the D.C. Circuit offers a simple summary of the law’s objections to 
multi-unit bargaining:  “Under this framework [of Borg-Warner], multi-unit bargaining 
has long been held a voluntary subject.  Allowing a party to insist on bargaining on other 
                                                 
50 Id. at 884. 
 
51 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 
52 Id. at 69-70. 
 
53 Id. at 70. 
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than a unit basis, it has been thought, would interfere with another provision of the Act.  
Section 9(a), to which the duty to bargain in good faith is made subject, states….”54  The 
court proceeds to quote from § 9(a), which is worth doing here as well: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective 
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate 
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment. 
 
Here the court helpfully returns attention to the statutory language from which the 
objections to multi-unit bargaining arise.  There are in fact two basic ways that multi-unit 
bargaining runs afoul of this section.  The first we have discussed at length:  a union is 
expected to limit its bargaining to matters relating to the substantive issues of its own 
employment, and therefore its bargaining demands must somehow directly and vitally 
affect its own employment conditions (the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test).  This limits the 
ability of a union to make demands on behalf of employees outside its bargaining unit.  
But § 9(a) presents a second obstacle to such demands:  representatives selected by 
employees are to be their exclusive bargaining representatives; no one else can bargain 
for them.  Thus a union has no right to bargain on behalf of employees outside its unit, 
because only those representatives chosen by those other employees are entitled to 
represent them.  Even if the first obstacle were overcome – even if a union’s demand on 
behalf of other employees were to satisfy the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test – the union’s 
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demand would still run up against this second barrier:  only representatives selected by 
the other employees may bargain on their behalf. 
It is this second obstacle, I believe, that prevents courts from reaching the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass test in cases of multi-unit bargaining; they in fact consider it to be 
the first obstacle, and do not need to go beyond it in disposing of the matter.  If, for 
instance, Yale University’s Local 35 were to insist on bargaining over the wages and 
hours of Yale’s hospital employees, a reviewing court would not need to try to puzzle its 
way through convoluted explanations of how these matters somehow vitally affect Local 
35 under Pittsburgh Plate Glass.  Rather, the court could simply rule that under § 9(a), 
only representatives selected by hospital employees are entitled to bargain over their 
wages and hours, and that Local 35 may therefore not do so.  This is one answer to 
Regan’s question why courts do not apply the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test to multi-unit 
bargaining:  they are able to decide the matter without it.  This may also explain the 
prejudice and skepticism that Regan notes that courts seem to have when they do apply 
that test to multi-unit bargaining:  the existence of this other obstacle under § 9(a), even 
when not explicitly mentioned, may lead courts simply to hold by a sort of imprecise 
legal shorthand that the demand flunks the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test. 
I suggested above that fourth-quadrant demands might meet with greater success 
under the current law than other multi-unit bargaining demands.  Suppose that Local 35, 
rather than trying to bargain over hospital employees’ wages and hours, demanded 
instead simply that Yale settle a collective bargaining agreement with its hospital 
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employees.55  This would be a fourth-quadrant demand:  it is made on behalf of someone 
other than the union itself, and it relates not to substantive terms of employment but 
rather to the bargaining process itself.56  Local 35 would still, of course, have to satisfy 
the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test by demonstrating somehow that a collective bargaining 
agreement for hospital employees is a matter than vitally affects Local 35’s employment; 
we will return to this point shortly.  But note that the obstacle presented by § 9(a) does 
not arise in this scenario.  In our earlier example Local 35 could not bargain over hospital 
employees’ wages and hours because, under § 9(a), representatives chosen by hospital 
employees “shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, 
or other conditions of employment.”  In other words, only representatives selected by 
hospital employees can bargain over their substantive terms of employment, and thus 
Local 35’s substantive demands on behalf of hospital employees are not allowed.  But § 
9(a), by its very language, applies only to such substantive demands.  Local 35’s demand 
that Yale bargain collectively with its hospital employees is not incompatible with the 
requirement that representatives chosen by the hospital employees shall be the exclusive 
representatives for bargaining over terms of employment.  Local 35’s fourth-quadrant 
demand does not seek to represent hospital employees or to bargain over the terms of 
their employment. 
                                                 
55 In these hypotheticals I assume that the hospital employees will have given some indication of a desire 
for collective representation.  See infra text accompanying notes 82-88 for further discussion of how this 
indication might be expressed. 
 
56 For recognition demands as procedural rather than substantive, see supra text accompanying note 35. 
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 It cannot be said exactly that the case law supports this reasoning, but that is 
largely because the case law does not offer many examples of fourth-quadrant demands.  
Standard Oil and Phelps Dodge, in which unions refused to settle their contracts until 
other unions also reached contracts, did indeed present fourth-quadrant demands 
somewhat similar to our imagined Local 35 demand; but in those cases, as we noted, the 
courts did not pass judgment on the fourth-quadrant demand as such.57  Thus the legality 
vel non of fourth-quadrant demands is not entirely settled; and it certainly seems to be the 
case that a union’s demand that its employer voluntarily recognize a separate union of 
previously non-unionized employees remains a matter of first impression.  But if the D.C. 
Circuit is correct in asserting that demands on behalf of employees outside the bargaining 
unit are problematic because they violate § 9(a),58 then that objection applies only to 
substantive demands relating to terms of employment, and not to procedural demands.  
This follows from the language of § 9(a), and is supported by the language in which 
courts condemn extra-unit demands.59 
 To return to our hypothetical, if Local 35 were successful in the argument that its 
demand (that Yale settle a collective bargaining agreement with representatives of its 
hospital employees) does not violate § 9(a) in the way that a substantive demand would, 
the demand would still have to satisfy the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test, which it would 
perhaps face without the prejudice that attaches to substantive multi-unit bargaining 
demands when they are judged under that test.  Local 35 would have to convince the 
                                                 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 35-44. 
 
58 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 
59 See, e.g., Amax Coal, 614 F.2d at 884 (noting that the offending clauses “would require Amax to bargain 
about wages and conditions of employment of employees in other units”) (emphasis added). 
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Board that a collective bargaining agreement for hospital employees would be a direct 
frontal attack on a matter that vitally affects the job security or conditions of employment 
of Local 35’s members.  Both of Yale’s existing unions clearly believe that this is true.  
The following excerpt is taken from a 2003 bulletin from the leadership of Yale’s unions 
to their members:60 
“All our futures are tied together,” Local 34 President Laura Smith 
told Yale negotiators.  “We care about the hospital employees and the 
Hospital because we care about achieving pensions that will allow us 
to retire with dignity; because we care about good wages; because we 
care about improving our workplace today and keeping our jobs 
tomorrow.” … Local 35 President Bob Proto reminded Yale of our 
history together.  “Everything we’ve achieved in our 60 years at Yale 
has been through unity and strength – our very survival depends on it.  
Yale has tried to divide and conquer our unions before.  But we know 
that our wages, our security, our pensions and everything else that 
matters to our members is tied to standing together with all the 
workers at Yale.  We’d much rather think it out and talk it out, but 
we’re prepared to fight it out if you insist.” 
 
Proto has also stated flatly, “What’s important for us is to strengthen the number of union 
members on campus.”61 
 The unions’ explanations for their support for the hospital employees seem almost 
to have been composed with the Pittsburgh Plate Glass test in mind.  They support other 
campus unions because they believe that it has an affect on their own job security 
(“keeping our jobs,” “our security,” “our very survival”) and their own wages and other 
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61 David Dashefsky, GESO Walkout Results in No Concrete Gains for Union Movement, Yale Daily News, 
April 10, 1995. 
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conditions of employment (pensions, wages, “improving our workplace”).  Their support 
is based less on a desire to improve hospital employees’ employment conditions than to 
improve their own.  These are exactly the sorts of issues that unions are supposed to be 
concerned with, the substantive terms and conditions of their members’ employment;  
Locals 34 and 35 believe that those terms and conditions will be improved by an overall 
increase in the number of unionized workers on campus.  They are not making 
substantive demands on behalf of those other workers, and they are not attempting to add 
those workers to the existing bargaining units.  They have thus managed to steer clear of 
the usual legal pitfalls of multi-unit bargaining. 
 
V. PROCEDURAL CROSS-UNIT DEMANDS AS MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING 
 
Yale’s existing unions have, to this point, raised the issue of union recognition for 
hospital employees only as a permissive subject of bargaining, which Yale has been free 
to ignore.62  What if the unions were instead to insist that Yale recognize a hospital 
employee union and to condition settlement of their own contracts on that issue?  As 
argued above, a fourth-quadrant demand of this sort would seemingly avoid the most 
common objections to multi-unit bargaining; but there would be no getting around the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass test.  To convince the Board that this is a mandatory subject as to 
which they may insist on bargaining without committing an unfair labor practice, the 
                                                 
62 A flat declaration by the existing unions that they refuse to bargain further unless Yale recognizes the 
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have never made unionization for the hospital employees a precondition to settling their own contracts; new 
contracts for Locals 34 and 35 were settled in September 2003. 
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unions would have to offer a persuasive argument in support of their contention that this 
matter vitally affects their own employment.  Obviously the breathless assertion that “our 
very survival depends on it” cannot by itself create a mandatory subject of bargaining.  
The circumstances of negotiation are likely to elicit much inflated rhetoric from all sides, 
but impassioned press releases are not dispositive of the legal questions.  What arguments 
might the unions make in support of their position? 
One possibility is suggested by the fact that coordinated bargaining is legal, as we 
have seen.  Separate unions are free to coordinate with one another their separate 
bargaining efforts with their employer.  They may, for example, demand that their 
bargaining committees include representatives from other unions,63 or that all of their 
contracts have the same expiration date,64 or that their contracts be modified to 
incorporate more favorable terms subsequently granted to employees in other units.65  
Such demands have been held to concern mandatory subjects of bargaining, and unions 
may insist on them without committing an unfair labor practice.  Courts have recognized 
that the purpose and result of coordinated bargaining is to give unions greater bargaining 
power,66 which in turn can yield better substantive terms of employment.67 
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64 United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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 So Union A and Union B may therefore engage in these sorts of coordinated 
bargaining strategies during their negotiations with their common employer, yielding 
more advantageous contract terms for both unions; courts have declared such strategies to 
be legal and have acknowledged that better contract terms are the result.  Imagine next a 
slightly different scenario:  suppose that the employer has only one recognized union, 
Union A, and that another group of employees are trying to organize a second union, 
Union B.  Union A, in the process of negotiating a new contract with the employer, 
demands that the employer recognize Union B and negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement with it.  Union A argues that the employer’s recognition of Union B is a 
matter than vitally affects Union A’s wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment.  The reasoning is as follows:  Union A’s coordinated bargaining demands 
vitally affect Union A’s employment (as is proved by the fact that coordinated bargaining 
demands are held to relate to mandatory subjects); bargaining between the employer and 
Union B is a prerequisite of Union A’s coordinated bargaining demands (for otherwise 
Union A would have no one with whom to coordinate its bargaining); therefore 
bargaining between the employer and Union B vitally affects Union A’s employment. 
This argument seems somehow facetious, but its logic is fairly straightforward.  If 
the employer recognizes and bargains with Union B, Union A would be able to take 
advantage of legal coordinated bargaining strategies and would likely end up with a 
better contract and more advantageous terms and conditions of employment.  For 
simplicity’s sake, this argument involved only two unions, but the same logic would 
apply if Unions A and B were demanding the recognition of Union C, or if A, B, and C 
were demanding the recognition of D, etc.  The greater the number of parties bargaining 
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with the employer, the greater the possibilities of coordinating their bargaining.  This is 
precisely what Bob Proto of Local 35has in mind when he states that it is important to 
increase the number of union members on campus, and that doing so will result in better 
wages and pensions for Local 35.  He is not under the impression that a collective 
bargaining agreement for hospital employees will itself provide for improved wages for 
Local 35; rather, he considers that the addition of another union with whom to coordinate 
bargaining will produce greater bargaining power and therefore better contract terms.  
The holdings of the courts’ coordinated bargaining cases fully support this idea. 
One might object that it seems undesirable to allow Local 35 to force Yale to 
bargain collectively with other employees.  Here we must remember what it means for 
something to be a mandatory subject of bargain.  It means only that a union or employer 
may insist upon such a demand to the point of impasse without committing an unfair 
labor practice; it does not mean that the other party must accept the demand.  When we 
suggest that Local 35 should be allowed to insist that Yale recognize the hospital 
employees, we do not mean that Yale should be forced to grant this, only that Local 35 
should be permitted to continue to demand it without having violated the duty to bargain 
in good faith.  Wages, for instance, are a mandatory subject of bargaining, but that does 
not mean that Local 35 can compel Yale to pay it any amount that the union wishes; if 
Yale considers the union’s demand to be too high, it may reject it and make an offer of its 
own.  Similarly, Yale would be free to reject Local 35’s demand that it recognize the 
hospital employees, and instead come up with its own counteroffer (“Let them rather win 
a Board election.”).  My argument is merely that Local 35 should not be guilty of an 
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unfair labor practice if it continues to insist upon its demand.  This may result in impasse, 
as is true of any mandatory bargaining demand. 
 Joel Rogers has offered additional evidence that may be pressed into service in 
support of Bob Proto’s assertion that an increase in the number of unionized workers is a 
matter that vitally affects the terms of employment of the existing unions.68  Rogers 
describes two factors that tend to keep unions weak in the United States:  the low level of 
union density (the low percentage of unionized employees out of the total number of 
employees who could be unionized), and the lack of union centralization (the splintering 
of unionized employees into many separate bargaining units).  He demonstrates that 
when both of these factors are present, employers have strong incentives to be hostile to 
unions and to attempt to eradicate them altogether.69  But these structural incentives 
change when unions begin to become stronger: 
At some point, however, if unions succeed in consolidating 
themselves, employers’ incentives shift markedly – first to 
enforcement and then containment of a compromise with workers.  
With growing levels of unionization, likely expressed in increased 
national political activity as well as increased membership and 
coordination of the labor movement itself, employers accept the 
reality of union power.  They move from attempting to eliminate 
its costs to generalizing them.70 
 
                                                 
68 Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor 
Laws,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1. 
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 Rogers suggests that because unions are not allowed to insist on multi-unit 
bargaining, they are unable to overcome their decentralization,71 and that an increase in 
the number of unionized workers is of no benefit as long as the unions remain 
separated.72  But as we have seen, even though unions cannot engage in full-blown multi-
unit bargaining (e.g. by demanding that an employer bargain over wages and benefits 
with several units at once), courts have ruled that they are nonetheless able legally to 
coordinate their bargaining demands in a variety of ways that increase their bargaining 
power with their employer.  The unions, for example, in General Electric and United 
States Pipe & Foundry were clearly able to overcome to a great extent the problem of 
decentralization and fragmentation that Rogers describes.73 
Rogers shows that an increase in the number and coordination of unionized 
workers makes it less likely for each union that its employer will pursue a strategy of 
hostility and attempted rollback.  If Rogers’ arguments are sound, and if we may assume 
that having their union busted is a problem that vitally affects the terms and conditions of 
workers’ employment, then a demand by a union that its employer bargain collectively 
with other groups of its employees would seem to be a direct frontal attack on a matter 
that vitally effects their employment.  It would therefore satisfy the Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass test and qualify as a mandatory subject of bargaining.  Given that such a demand, 
as noted above, does not violate the literal language of § 9(a) in the way that demands 
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relating to other employees’ substantive issues clearly do, it seems that it might be 
possible to satisfy the Board or a court that a union should be allowed to insist on such a 
demand without committing an unfair labor practice.  Rogers’ work also supplies us with 
a policy argument in favor of allowing unions to make fourth-quadrant demands.  His 
models show that higher levels of unionization and coordination among unions ultimately 
lead to a reduction in hostility between unions and management74 and an increase in 
social efficiency,75 a result very much in keeping with the stated policy goals of the 
NLRA.76 
The Supreme Court has also offered support for the idea that unions may benefit 
from the unionization of additional employees in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,77 a case that is not 
itself concerned with cross-unit bargaining, but which contains the germ of a potentially 
very strong vision of cross-unit solidarity. 
In Eastex the Court held that a union had a right under § 7 to distribute a 
newsletter containing not only material relating to that particular union but also material 
relating to the political interests of organized labor generally.  The Court observes that 
the “mutual aid or protection” language of § 7 was modeled on similar language in the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, of which the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to 
protect the “right of wage earners to organize and to act jointly in questions affecting 
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wages, conditions of labor, and the welfare of labor generally.”78  The Court defended 
statements in the newsletter as “concerted activity for the ‘mutual aid and protection’ of 
petitioner’s employees and of employees generally.”79  Furthermore, the Court states, 
“Unions have a legitimate and substantial interest in continuing organizational efforts 
after recognition.  Whether the goal is merely to strengthen or preserve the union’s 
majority, or is to achieve 100% employee membership… these organizing efforts are 
equally entitled to the protection of § 7.”80  This statement comes in the context of a 
union’s attempts to further organize its own bargaining unit, not to organize other 
workers generally; but these two statements taken together make a strong case for the 
interest of unionized employees in the unionization of other employees, and especially 
other employees of the same employer.  Locals 34 and 35 have long asserted that they 
would be directly strengthened by the unionization of other segments of Yale’s 
employees, and the Court’s remarks in Eastex seem to support their interest in this 
matter.81 
 In our hypothetical, Local 35 has demanded, as a condition of settling its contract, 
that Yale also settle a collective bargaining agreement with its hospital employees, and I 
have suggested that under the current case law, one could argue that such a demand 
should be considered to relate to a mandatory subject of bargaining.  We have not yet, 
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81 To be sure, the Court is only talking about § 7 rights, and to hold that a thing is protected under § 7 does 
not necessarily make it a mandatory subject of bargaining; a union’s right under § 7 to organize other 
employees of the same employer does not at once translate into the union’s right to insist as a bargaining 
demand that the employer also bargain with those other employees.  Nonetheless, the Court’s statements 
are quite compatible with, and even seem to anticipate, Rogers’ findings, and suggest that the unionization 
of additional employees can be a matter that satisfies the “vitally affects” test of Pittsburgh Plate Glass.  
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however, considered that it might be the case that most hospital employees do not wish to 
become unionized, and that this is certainly not a decision that Local 35 can make for 
them over their opposition.  Hospital employees have a right under § 7 to choose their 
own bargaining representatives, or to choose not to be represented collectively at all; it is 
a decision that is wholly theirs to make.  Interference by Local 35 with the hospital 
employees’ decision concerning representation would be a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A),82 
and acquiescence by Yale in Local 35’s demand would be a violation of § 8(a)(1);83 it is 
not the place of Local 35 or of Yale to decide if hospital employees are to be represented 
collectively.  This principle emerges directly from the statutory language of §§ 7-8, and 
has been emphasized by courts faced with situations in which a union desires that other 
employees be added to its bargaining unit.84  If the employer opposes the union’s demand 
for bargaining unit accretion, a union’s insistence on it will constitute an illegal attempt 
to expand the scope of the bargaining unit;85 but even when a demand for accretion meets 
with the employer’s consent, it nonetheless deprives the other employees of the right to 
decide for themselves whom they wish to have as their bargaining representative, or 
whether they wish to be represented collectively at all.86 
 Local 35, then, could not simply demand that Yale bargain collectively with the 
hospital employees without trampling on their § 7 rights; but it could demand that Yale 
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84 See, e.g., Welch Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1965); Sheraton-Kauai Corp. v. NLRB, 
429 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970); Boire v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 
85 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 
86 See, e.g., Boire, 479 F.2d at 799. 
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bargain with its hospital employees if a majority of them express a desire for such 
collective representation.  What form would this expression take?  One possibility would 
be a Board election; Local 35 could demand that Yale agree not to appeal the result of 
such an election, and to bargain with the hospital employees if they win it.  Some less 
formal process might suffice as well.  In cases involving bargaining unit accretion, the 
Board and the courts have indicated that the § 7 rights of the employees who are to be 
added to the union are not violated if those employees are allowed “the opportunity of 
expressing their preference in a secret election or by some other evidence that they wish 
to authorize the Union to represent them.”87  This “other evidence” can consist of a 
majority of signatures on union authorization cards, provided that such signatures 
represent a meaningful expression of intent.88  In our hypothetical, Local 35 is demanding 
that Yale recognize a hospital employee union voluntarily (i.e., without a Board election), 
and so any of the means by which employers typically determine the presence of a 
majority before granting voluntary recognition would suffice here as well (card count; 




 The established classificatory framework for cross-unit bargaining is imprecise 
and obscures the central reason why most multi-unit bargaining is condemned by the 
                                                 
87 Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1969), followed by, e.g., Boire, 479 F.2d at 795-96. 
 
88 Cf. Sheraton-Kauai Corp., 429 F.2d at 1357 (finding authorization cards to be an inadequate expression 
of intent because employees “were merely ratifying what they had been advised had already been done,” 
believing the result to be a foregone conclusion). 
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Board and the courts:  it is typically found to relate to the substantive terms of 
employment of employees outside the bargaining unit.  Remembering that unions make 
procedural as well as substantive demands, and considering the possibility of procedural 
bargaining in the cross-unit realm, we find that such procedural cross-unit demands seem 
to avoid the legal obstacles that confront most multi-unit bargaining, and may allow for 
greater strategic advantages than are available with conventional coordinated bargaining. 
 
